AlpyneBryan McGowanFractional CFO
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Case study · DTC apparel

Zero to $400k a month, and no accounting behind any of it

A DTC apparel brand whose finance setup never caught up. Investor meetings in two weeks and no P&L.

DTC apparel brand · Utah · Shopify + wholesale · Presale/backorder model · ~$3–4M annualized


What was happening

The company went from nothing to roughly $400,000 a month inside a year. Direct-to-consumer through Shopify, wholesale relationships forming, a presale and backorder model where cash arrived well before product shipped.

By any outward measure it was working. The growth was real and it was fast.

The finance side never got built. And now the founders were preparing for investor meetings — conversations that require you to answer questions about your own business with numbers.

They didn’t have any.

What they thought they needed

A CFO. They were right. The questions in front of them were CFO questions: how much inventory to carry at this growth rate, what the real return on ad spend was, whether the margin structure would survive the next tripling, what to raise and against what.

Those questions just weren’t answerable yet.

What was actually going on

There was no accounting, going back to the founding of the company.

There was a QuickBooks account, which made it worse rather than better. Default chart of accounts, never configured. The only transactions posting to it were Shopify deposits, landing directly in revenue. Everything else — inventory purchases, ad spend, freight, returns, contractors, the credit line — was absent from the ledger entirely.

The file still produced financial statements. That’s the danger. An empty QuickBooks file tells you the truth about what you know. A file like this one produces numbers that look like answers, and you run a business against them for a year before anyone checks.

What the founders could actually see about a company doing $400k a month:

  1. The balance in the bank accounts.
  2. Gross sales in Shopify.

That’s the entire list. Not revenue — gross sales, which stops being the same number the moment you account for returns, discounts, platform fees, and a presale model where cash lands a month or two before the sale is earned. No margin. No operating profit. No inventory or landed cost. No return on ad spend.

Underneath that, a few specific problems:

Shopify deposits were being booked as revenue. Shopify pays out net of fees, refunds, and chargebacks. Recording the deposit understates revenue and erases the entire cost structure of the channel in one move.

Real spending sat outside the business. Inventory purchases and ad spend running through a personal account — ordinary in a fast-growing young company, and a genuine problem. Those are real costs. If they’re not in the ledger, every margin number is fiction.

Inventory and cost data was thin. Reconstructing what was purchased, what it cost landed, and what was actually on hand took real work.

The presale model required accrual treatment. Cash-in and revenue-earned were happening in different periods. On a cash view the business looked far better in some months and far worse in others than it actually was.

The constraint

Twelve months of backfill, plus CFO-level analysis ready for investor meetings, in two weeks.

That timeline is the whole story. Scoped conventionally, this is six to eight weeks of mechanical work before anyone can say anything intelligent about the business — and by then the meetings have already happened.

What got done

First call to signed engagement: two days. Signed to working books and analytics: two weeks.

The work itself:

Accrual-basis Shopify integration across the full cycle. Gross sales, platform fees, refunds, and chargebacks pulled apart and posted properly, rather than deposits hitting revenue.

A chart of accounts rebuilt for this business — two channels with genuinely different margin structures — in about fifteen minutes rather than a week of workshops.

Bulk reclassification across twelve months of ledger, instead of correcting line by line.

High-throughput cash reconciliation, AI-assisted, with the founders answering only the handful of items nobody else could answer.

CFO-level analytics combining ledger, Shopify, and marketing data — so return on ad spend measured against real cost rather than gross sales.

An investor memo built on all of it.

None of that replaced the judgment calls. Where the accrual boundaries sit, how to treat presale cash, how to structure a chart of accounts for two channels — that’s the actual job. What it replaced was the six weeks of mechanical work standing between a CFO and being useful.

What they have now

Financial statements that reflect the business and would survive someone looking hard at them. Margin by channel. Real return on ad spend. Inventory position against what’s actually selling. A live system that stays current instead of a cleanup that starts decaying the day it finishes. And an investor memo grounded in numbers rather than instinct.

They’re now moving into ongoing work — the inventory planning and capital strategy questions they originally called about.

That’s usually the shape of it. People call about the top of the stack. The work starts at the bottom.


The thing worth taking from this

If you’re growing fast and running the business off a bank balance and a sales dashboard, you’re not unusual. Most companies at this stage are further behind than they think, and having accounting software sometimes makes it worse, because a file that produces numbers feels like an answer.

These founders weren’t disorganized. They built something that worked faster than the finance side could keep up with. That’s the normal failure mode of fast growth, not a character flaw.

What made it a two-week job instead of a two-month one wasn’t heroics. It was starting at the bottom, and not doing the mechanical parts by hand.



Client details anonymized. Timings describe this engagement.